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Public Investment and Re-election Prospects 





A growing literature suggests that office motivated politicians manipulate fiscal policy 
instruments in order to seek their re-election. This paper investigates the impact of electoral 
manipulation of the level and composition of fiscal policy on incumbent’s re-election 
prospects. This impact is estimated for a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1972- 
1999. Our results suggest that increased public investment during the term in office, as well as 
a shift in expenditures towards public investment can improve re-election prospects. On the 
contrary, election year manipulation via public investment does not affect re-election 
prospects. We also find that voters punish politicians who create deficits during elections, 
while deficits that proceed the election year have similar, although smaller effects on the 
reelection prospects. 
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1. Introduction 
Since  Nordhaus  (1975)  seminal  work,  a  rich  literature  suggests  that  office  motivated 
incumbents apply expansionary fiscal policy in order to seek their re-election. In a rational 
expectations framework political budget cycles still arise under the driving assumption of 
temporary information asymmetries between voters and politicians regarding the competence 
level of the latter.
1  
Electoral manipulation of fiscal policy may also concern the composition of public 
spending rather than its level. Rogoff (1990) provided a firm theoretical foundation showing 
that electorally motivated incumbents signal their competence by shifting public spending 
towards more ‘visible’ government consumption and away from public investment goods. 
Following this argument Katsimi and Sarantides (2011) investigate the electoral impact on 
the composition of fiscal policy for a sample of developed countries.
2 Their evidence suggest 
that  during  elections  incumbents  decrease  capital  expenditures  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  
shifting the composition of public spending towards ‘visible’ current expenditures and away 
from capital expenditures. In addition, it seems that incumbents decrease public investment in 
order to finance  a fall in direct taxation that provides an immediate economic benefit to 
voters while keeping the fiscal balance unaffected. 
To what extend is, however, fiscal manipulation ‘punished’ by voters? In other words, 
does, fiscal manipulation affect the re-election probability, and if yes, is the effect positive or 
negative?  To  our  knowledge,  Brender  and  Drazen  (2008)  is  the  only  existing  study  that 
directly tests at the national level the impact of budget deficits on the re-election probability.
3 
Their study finds no evidence that deficits help re-election, while in developed countries and 
in  old  democracies  increased  deficits  reduce  the probability  of  re-election.  Other  studies, 
conducted at state and local level in a single country, found that voters punish rather than 
reward  loose  fiscal  policies  (see  Peltzman  (1992),  Brender  (2003),  Drazen  and  Elsava 
(2010)). These results support the notion that voters punish loose fiscal policies at the polls, 
and even more if they are perceived as electorally motivated.  
Regarding the relationship between public investment expenditures and re-election 
prospects, studies are limited and are concentrated at the local level. Veiga and Veiga (2007) 
using a data set for Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979-2001 find that 
                                                 
1  In the  moral-hazard  type  political  budget  cycles  (PBC)  models  the  incumbent has  an incentive  to  signal  its  level  of 
competence by increasing election-year deficits, through expansion in expenditures or cuts in taxes, in order to provide 
immediate economic benefit to voters (see e.g. Rogoff and Sibert (1988)). On the other hand, in the adverse selection type 
PBC models (see e.g. Shi and Svensson (2006)) fiscal manipulation in equilibrium does not affect re-election probability. 
2 For an empirical investigation of this argument for developing countries see Vergne (2009).  
3 Buti et al. (2010) check the effect of economic reforms on re-election for a sample of 21 OECD countries over the period 
1985-2003. They found that the electoral impact of the reform depends strongly on which types of policies are considered.    3 
higher investment expenditures around elections, as well as during the term in office, are 
associated with a higher vote share for incumbent mayors.
4 Sakurai and Menezes (2008) 
using a panel of more than 2000 Brazilian municipalities over the period 1988 to 2000, find 
that  higher  capital  spending  over  the  years  preceding  elections  increase  the  re-election 
prospects,  while  the  deviation  of  capital  spending  in  election  year  is  not  beneficial  to 
incumbent mayors.  
In this study we attempt to bridge a gap in the literature by examining at the national 
level  the  impact  of  public  investment  and  the  composition  of  public  spending  on  the 
incumbent’s re-election prospects. We believe that this is an important step in order to be able 
to derive more general policy conclusions since it is difficult to compare results applying to 
local governments across countries. This difficulty stems from the fact that fiscal items that 
are clearly identifiable as provincial government responsibilities differ from one country to 
another.  In  our  analysis,  distinguish between policies  that  occur  in the  election  year  and 
policies that occur proceeding the election year. Brender and Drazen (2008) found that in 
developed countries deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent’s term in office reduce the 
probability  of  re-election  but  to  a  less  extent  in  comparison  with  election  year  deficits. 
Accordingly, we may anticipate that increased capital expenditures in the earlier years in 
office are better noticed by voters near the completion of the term, since these expenditures 
are mostly long term projects which are observed by voters with a lag.  
To model the re-election determinants we use information on 122 electoral campaigns 
for 21 high-income OECD. Our empirical results suggest that re-election prospects improve 
following a rise in capital expenditures or a shift of expenditures towards capital expenditures 
during the incumbent’s term in office, while they remain unaffected by manipulation around 
the election period. Thus, although voters reward incumbents who promote public investment 
during  their  term  in  office,  electoral  spending  on  public  investment  is  not  rewarded. 
Similarly,  a  fall  in public  investment spending  is  not punished by  voters. The  latter can 
probably be attributed to the “lower visibility” of capital expenditures that are mostly long-
term  projects  that  increase  voter’s  utility  upon  completion  (e.g.  infrastructure)  and  are 
observed by the voters with a lag. Moreover, similarly to Brender and Drazen (2008) we find 
that voters in developed countries dislike and punish deficits and inflation.  
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that Adit et al. (2011) using the same sample of Portuguese municipalities show that opportunistic 
behavior of incumbent mayors leads to a higher win margin and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their 
win margin is small.    4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, 
specifies the econometric model and contains our basic findings. Section 3 then reports the 
results of robustness tests. The last section concludes. 
 
 
2. Econometric Analysis 
2.1. Data and estimation method 
The baseline political variable leader re-election is based on information from the “World 
Statesmen” encyclopedia and from the "Inter-Parliamentary Union" database. These data 
allow us to follows the terms of individual leaders and parties in office from appointment to 
termination, and to associate them with election dates.  It is worth noting that we only include 
legislative  elections  for  countries  with  parliamentary  political  systems  and  presidential 
elections for countries with presidential systems. 
  In  line  with  Brender  and  Drazen  (2008),  leader  re-election  variable  includes 
observations in which the leader has been in office for at least two years prior to the elections. 
It takes value 1 if the incumbent chief executive is re-elected and 0 otherwise. It also allows 
for the following special cases: 
(i)  In cases where the leader quits within the year of elections, leader re-election receives 
the value 0. 
(ii) In cases where candidates replace leaders that were subject to a legal limit, leader re-
election receives the value 1 if the reigning leader’s party is winning in the elections 
and 0 if it loses.  
(iii) In cases where during the election year a leader is replaced because he died or quitted 
due to health problems, leader re-election receives the value 1 if the successor leader 
gets reelected and 0 otherwise. 
(iv)   If the appointed prime minister of the governing coalition after the current elections 
comes  from  the  same party  with  his predecessor  and  this party  received  a  higher 
support in comparison with previous election, leader re-election variable receives the 
value 1 and 0 otherwise. 
5 
Our  sample  includes  21  high-income  OECD  countries.
6  Regarding  the  leader  re-election 
definition, we have 113 campaigns in which the leader was reelected in 57 cases. It is worth 
                                                 
5 Becuase we do not want to reduce an already small sample, for special cases (ii) and (iv) we actually follow party’s re-
election instead of leader re-election. Alternaltively, if we drop these observations from our sample qualitative results remain 
unaffected.  
6  The  countries  of  our  sample  are  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States. South Korea is excluded from the sample because the President has no possibility of re-election, while at the same   5 
noting that in 109 out of 113 campaigns of our sample the same person who had been the 
head of the government before the elections is the one seeking for re-election.   
Following  previous  studies  in  this  area  our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  central 
government data [see among others, Schuknecht (2000) and Brender and Drazen (2008)]
7. 
Our  fiscal  data  are  obtained  from  the  Global  Development  Network  Growth  Database 
(GDNGD).  Primary  data  for  the  proceeds  are  taken  from  IMF,  "Government  Financial 
Statistics" (GFS); and data for GDP come from Global Development Finance and World 
Development Indicators. Note that due to data availability we have to restrict our data set to 
the period from 1972 to 1999.
8 A complete list of all variables used in our estimations is 
provided in the Data Appendix with details on data sources and descriptive statistics. 
In order to model the impact of public investment on re-election prospects, we use the 
economic classification provided by the GFS database and we construct variable capital term 
by computing the average of the capital expenditures during the leader’s current term in the 
office (excluding the election year of previous elections, but including the election year of 
current elections). At the same time, we want to check if pre-electoral manipulation in capital 
expenditures affects re-election prospects. For this reason we split variable capital term into 
variables capital deviation and capital non-election. The first of these two variables is the 
change in the capital expenditures in the election year relative to the average of the years 
preceding elections (excluding the election year of previous elections). The second of these 
two variables is the average in the fiscal variable during the leader’s (party’s) term in the 
office preceding the election year (excluding the election year of previous elections).  Finally, 
given  that  it  takes  time  for  investment  to be materialized,  we  include  in  our  estimations 
variable initial capital, which is capital expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the first year 
during  the  term  in  office  (we  do  not  consider  in  the  term  the  election  year  of  previous 
elections).  
Alternatively,  we  calculate  the  percentage  of  central  government’s  capital  to  current 
expenditures in order to test if the composition of expenditures affects re-election prospects. 
                                                                                                                                                        
time we cannot follow party’s re-election for the two observations we have (1992, 1997) since they were dissolved. New 
Zealand is excluded from the sample due to unavailability for fiscal data. We included in the sample two small OECD 
countries Iceland and Luxemburg because we did not want to reduce an already small sample. Moreover, when we dropped 
these countries from our sample qualitative results remain unaffected. 
7 We base our analysis on central government data for two reasons: First, given that general government data include all levels of 
government (state, local, central), results based on such data would be more difficult to interpret. As noted by Schuknecht (2000) the central 
government controls directly only its own budget while changes in public spending of the general government may be affected by both state 
and local elections. Second, data from general government accounts are less consistent across countries and time periods. 
8 GFS data until the late nineties has been calculated using Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986 classification, while 
data beyond this point has been calculated with the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 framework. Unfortunately, 
the new classification does no longer provide data for the capital expenditures and current expenditures series included in the 
GFSM 1986 classification. For more details see Katsimi and Sarantides (2011).    6 
In a direct analogy to the definitions in the previous paragraph regarding capital expenditures, 
we construct variables composition term, composition deviation, composition non-election 
and initial composition.  
Apart from the fiscal variables, we include in our estimated model a number of socio-
economic  and  political  variables.  More  specifically  the  following  control  variables  are 
included in the model specification:  
(i)  Macroeconomic  conditions:  For  comparison  reasons  we  use  the  main  control 
variables of Brender and Drazen (2008) namely the growth rate of output (growth 
term) and the inflation rate (inflation term) during the term in office. Although studies 
for developed countries contradict regarding the effect of growth rates of output on 
voting behavior (see e.g. Brender and Drazen (2008), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)), 
we  anticipate  that  a  higher  growth  rate  during  the  term  in  office  is  positively 
associated  with  re-election  prospects.  On  the  contrary,  we  expect  that  variable 
inflation term affects negatively re-election prospects since voters dislike inflation and 
punish at the polls incumbents that create it (see e.g. Alesina et al. (1998)). These data 
are from the World Bank's ‘World Development Indicators’ (WDI). 
(ii) New  democracy  effect:  We  include  in  our  estimations  the  dummy  variable  new 
democracy that receives the value 1 for the period of the first 4 elections after Greece, 
Portugal and Spain shift to a democratic regime. According to Brender and Drazen 
(2005),  these  “new”  democracies  are  more  prone  to  fiscal  manipulation,  since 
incumbents might be rewarded at the polls if they can “mislead” inexperienced voters 
by attributing the good economic conditions to their competency.
9  
(iii)Level of “awareness”: As a measure of “awareness” we use variable illiteracy term 
that is the proportion of population aged 15 years old and above with no schooling. It 
is taken by a dataset collected by Barro and Lee (2010) that covers successive five 
year  averages. We expect illiteracy  rate to be  associated with low levels of voter 
“sophistication” and, hence, with higher re-election prospects.  
(iv)  Ideological  orientation:  We  create  dummy  variable  centre  (left)  that  receives  the 
value 1 if the cabinet in power scores 3 (4 or 5) on the ideology index govparty of 
Armigneon et al. (2008). We expect that the probability of success is much lower for 
centrist governments since these governments are in most of the cases coalition and 
                                                 
9 We included in our sample Greece, Portugal and Spain, because we did not want to reduce an already small sample. On the 
other hand, when we drop from our estimations these countries our qualitative results remain unaffected.   7 
fragmented governments.
10 At the same time, we want to test for differences in re-
election prospects between left-wing and right wing incumbents.  
(v)  Reforms: Finally, we include in our estimations dummy variable EU that receives the  
value 1 for the period 1993-1999 for countries that where members of the European 
Union and signed the Maastricht treaty. This variable receives the value 1 for the period 
1995-1999  for  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  that  become  members  of  the  European 
Union at the 1 January 1995. Note that the period after the adjustment of ERM bands 
and before the establishment of the euro-area was characterized by EU member states 
effort to comply with the convergence criteria. This effort included a process for fiscal 
consolidation. Thus, this variable should capture the impact of the countries effort to 
adopt the Euro on the incumbent’s re-election prospects. 
       It is also worth mentioning, that we have attempted to include in our model a series of 
other control variables such as the percentage of votes the incumbent receive in the previous 
elections, dummies to control for majoritarian vs. proportional systems and presidential vs. 
parliamentary governments as well the number of terms the incumbent chief executive has 
been  in  office.  However,  none  of  these  variables  had  a  significant  effect  on  re-election 
prospects  and  in  order  to  preserve  degrees  of  freedom  we  do  not  include  them  in  our 
estimations.
11 
We examine the impact of fiscal performance on re-election prospects using a Probit 
estimator  with  robust  standard  errors  to  both  heteroskedasticity  (Huber-White  sandwich 
estimators) and any form of intra-cluster serial correlation.
12 It is worth noting that we test for 
the presence of random effects using  a likelihood ratio test. According to the results we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero 
and consequently that random effects improve the pooled model significantly. In our panel 
where the number of cross sections exceeds the number of time units, the pooled Probit 
model  would  be  more  efficient  since  it  requires  fewer  parameters  to  be  estimated  in 
comparison with a random effects model.
13 
                                                 
10 We also included in the model specification a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 for coalition governments and 0 
otherwise.  In  accordance  with  the  findings  of  Alesina  et  al.  (1997)  we  find  a  negative  relation  between  coalition 
governments and the probability of re-election. At the same time, when we inserted in our regressions cabinet orientation, 
the coefficient for coalition governments turned out insignificant, while results for all other variables remain unchanged. 
This is a clear indication that centre orientated governments and coalition governments are two sides of the same coin.     
11 Note that including these additional control variables in our specification does not change our basic findings. Results 
available upon request.  
12 We also repeat the same estimations using a Logit specification without any qualitative change in our results. 
13 It is worth noting that if we account for heterogeneity among countries using a Random Effects model, qualitative results 
(available upon request) do not change significantly. On the other hand, we have not attempted to apply Fixed Effects in our 
Probit regressions, because this would lead to inconsistent estimates (see e.g. Woolridge (2002))   8 
 
2.2. Results 
In  Table  1  we  examine  the  effect  of  capital  expenditures  and  the  composition  of  public 
expenditures on the probability of re-election. Regarding the socio-economic variables, we 
observe  that  inflation  term  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  while  growth  term  is 
insignificantly  related  with  leader  re-election.  These  results  seem  to  verify  the  previous 
studies of Alesina et al. (1998) and Brender and Drazen (2008) who found that voters dislike 
inflation,  while  growth  rate  does  not  seem  to  affect  re-election  prospects.  Moreover,  the 
coefficient of variable illiteracy term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
lower levels of voter awareness are positively related to reelection prospects.  
Regarding government’s ideology, our results indicate that variable left (centre) is 
positive (negative) and significantly related with leader re-election. These results show that 
leftist (centrist) governments seem to have a higher (lower) probability to get re-elected in 
comparison with right wing governments. This result could reflect that more often leftish 
incumbents adopt policies that are more ‘popular’ to the majority of voters. As far as the 
centrist  incumbents  are  concerned,  this  result  might  be  related  to  the  fact  that  centrist 
governments are in most of the cases fragmented coalition governments. In addition, variable 
new democracy is positive when statistically significant, indicating that in new democracies 
leaders have a higher probability to get re-elected. Finally, variable EU has a negative and 
significant coefficient in all estimated equations. This result could be attributed to the conduct 
of strict and ‘unpopular’ policies aiming at that the nominal convergence process required by 
euro-area participation. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Regarding the fiscal performance, as can be seen in column 1 (4) of Table 1 we show 
that variable capital term (composition term) is positively and significantly related to leader 
re-election at the 1% (5%) level of significance. This result indicates an increase of 1% in 
capital term (composition term) leads to an increase of about 9.4% (3.3%) in the chances of 
re-election.  
As a next step, we split variables capital and composition term into variables capital 
deviation and capital non-election and variables composition deviation and composition non-
election. As can be seen in columns 2 and 5 respectively, variables capital deviation and 
composition deviation, which reflect the change in fiscal variable in the election year relative   9 
to  the  average  of  the  years  preceding  elections  (excluding  the  election  year  of  previous 
elections), do not seem to affect re-election prospects. Existing empirical evidence for the 
same sample of countries suggests that during elections capital expenditures decrease in order 
to finance a fall in direct taxation [see Katsimi and Sarantides (2011)]. This finding simply 
indicates that this fall in capital expenditure is not ‘punished’ by voting behaviour because 
this  cut  is  not  ‘visible’  by  voters  in  the  election  period.  Capital  expenditures  (e.g. 
infrastructure)  are  mostly  long-term  projects  that  will  increase  voter’s  utility  upon 
completion. Likewise, a change in the expenditure composition initiated by the fall in capital 
expenditure does not affect voting behaviour because this cut is not ‘visible’ in the election 
period. On the contrary, variables capital non-election and composition non-election over the 
term in office, excluding the election year, are positive and significantly related to leader re-
election.  More  specifically,  an  increase  of  1%  in  capital  non-election  (composition  non-
election) can increase the probability of re-election by 10.4% (3.4%). Finally, in columns 3 
and 6 we observe that variables initial capital and composition are positively related to leader 
re-election. As expected, given that it takes time for investment to be materialized, capital 
expenditures in the first year of the term in office are most likely to be visible to voters at the 
election  period  increasing  the  re-election  prospects  of  the  incumbent.  In  particular,  an 
increase of 1% in initial capital (initial composition) leads to an increase of about 8.7% 
(3.0%) in the chances of re-election. This implies that an incumbent who wishes to maximize 
his re-election prospects should frontload public spending: He should spend on capital as 
soon  as  he  is  elected  in  order  to  allow  for  a  sufficient  period  for  this  spending  to  be 
materialized and observed by voters while he should lower capital spending in the final year 
of his term when this type of spending has the lowest visibility.    
 
3. Robustness 
In  this  section  we  examine  the  robustness  of  the  above  results  by  re-estimating  our 
regressions  under  various  modifications.  First,  we  check  if  our  results  remain  unaffected 
when we keep in regressions only the predetermined elections. Second, we create variable 
party re-election so that to associate election outcomes with party’s performance. Finally, we 
add in our estimations fiscal variables surplus and revenues in order to have a complete 
specification of the budget constraint.  
 
3.1. The timing of elections    10 
Regarding  the  timing  of  elections,  Katsimi  and  Sarntides  (2011)  found  that  only  during 
predetermined elections incumbents reduce capital expenditures and shift the composition of 
expenditures  towards  public  investment.  This  result  is  consistent  with  Roggof’s  (1990) 
argument that during predetermined elections opportunistic incumbents have ample to use 
fiscal policy in order to increase re-election probabilities, far greater, compared to the case of 
elections being called earlier. Hence, in line with Brender and Drazen (2005) we look at the 
constitutionally-determined election interval and we keep in or sample those elections that are 
characterized as predetermined and are held during the expected year of the constitutionally-
fixed term. At the same time we choose to exclude endogenous elections from our sample 
since they probably introduce an important endogeneity bias. In endogenous elections the re-
election probability can affect the election date in two ways: Firstly, elections may be called 
when the re-election prospects are favourable and secondly, coalition governments may be 
more vulnerable when re-election probability is low. As can be seen in Table 2, our results 
indicate that excluding endogenous elections suggests an even stronger connection between 
the fiscal variables and re-election prospects. For instance, we observe that an increase of 1% 
in capital term (composition term) leads to an increase of about 16.5% (4.5%) in the chances 
of re-election.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2. Party vs. leader re-election 
Until now we have applied as dependent variable in our estimations leader re-election that 
follows the terms of individual leaders in office. Given that parties stay in power for longer 
periods  than  leaders  and  that  capital  expenditure  are  mostly  long-term  projects  that  will 
increase voter’s utility upon completion, one could expect investment expenditures to have a 
stronger impact on parties’ re-election than on leaders’ re-election. Hence, in accordance to 
the construction of variable leader re-election we alternatively follow the terms of parties in 
office and we construct variable party re-election. It should be mentioned that we have many 
cases  in  our  sample  in  which  the  values  of  the  two  key  political  variables  deviate.  For 
instance, when the leader in office resigns within the year of election variable leader re-
lection  receives  value  0,  while  party  re-election  receives  value  1  if  the  successor  leader 
comes from the same party and gets reelected. Regarding the party re-election definition, we 
have 122 campaigns in which the party in power was reelected in 71 cases. As expected, in 
Table  3,  we  depict  an  even  stronger  relationship  between  public  investment  and  the   11 
composition of expenditures to party re-election. Hence, we find that an increase of 1% in 
capital term (composition term) leads to an increase of about 11.1% (4.0%) in the chances of 
re-election.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
3.3. Additional fiscal instruments 
The final robustness exercise we conduct is to add budget surplus/deficit and total revenues in 
our estimations in order to have a full specification of the government budget constraint [see 
Kneller  et  al.  (1999)].
14  In  order  to  avoid  perfect  multi-collinearity  one  element  of  the 
government budget should be omitted. Given that in columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 we include 
variable composition term that contains variable current expenditures, we choose to omit the 
latter  from  the  specification.    Regarding  the  interpretation  of  the  results,  the  estimated 
coefficient γj measures the marginal impact of fiscal variable Xj on re-election prospects, net 
of the marginal impact of fiscal variable Xm, that we exclude from specification and is the 
assumed financing element. This implies that current expenditures are the financing element 
in columns 1 to 3 and total expenditures in columns 3 to 6.  
In  accordance  to  the  above  definitions  we  construct  for  budget  surplus/deficit 
variables  surplus  term,  surplus  deviation,  surplus  non-election  and  initial  surplus,  while 
similarly  for  total  revenues  we  construct  variables  revenues  term,  revenues  deviation, 
revenues non-election and initial revenues. As can be seen in Table 3, total revenues do not 
seem to affect re-election chances in none of our estimations. On the contrary, in columns 1 
to 3 we observe that except for the case of the first year during the term in office, budget 
surplus/deficit is rewarded/punished by the voters at the polls.  In particular, a decrease of 1% 
in  surplus  term  (surplus  non-election)  leads  to  a  decrease  of  about  3.5%  (4.8%)  in  the 
chances of re-election. In addition, it seems that election year deficits have an even stronger 
effect on the probability of re-lection. We find that a decrease of 1% in surplus deviation can 
decrease  re-election  chances  by  7.9%.  These  findings  are  corroborated  by  the  results 
presented in Brender and Drazen (2008), in which a decrease of 1% in the budget surplus 
deteriorates  the  probability  of  re-election  by  3  to  5%  in  developed  countries  and  that  a 
decrease of 1% in the surplus during an election year decreases the probability of re-election 
by 7 to 9%. Based on the full specification of the government budget constraint we have 
                                                 
14 For details see pp. 174-175 of their paper. 
   12 
implemented, this implies that if the incumbent increase the budget deficit around elections 
via current expenditures this will decrease the chances of re-election by 7.9%. This implies 
that incumbents have an incentive to avoid deficit creation and to finance expansionary fiscal 
policies through a fall in less visible capital spending. Regarding capital expenditures, we 
find that decreasing public spending in the election year is not ‘punished’ by voters, while 
overall public investment spending has a positive impact on the incumbent’s probability of 
re-election.  This  is  an  expected  result,  since  it  is  logical  to  assume  that  overall  public 
investment spending is more visible to voters than capital spending in the election period. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
  Next, in columns 3 to 6 we observe that election year deficits seem to decrease the 
probability of re-election by 7.6%, while deficits over the term in office and preceding the 
election  year  affect  re-election  prospects  by  2.6%  and  3.2%  respectively.  Given  that  we 
control for the composition of expenditures, this means that the probability of re-election 
deteriorates if incumbents increase the deficit over their term in office by increasing in equal 
proportions  public  investment  and  consumption.  Finally,  regarding  the  effect  of  the 
composition  of  expenditures  on  re-election  prospects  the  qualitative  results  presented  in 
Table 4 remain essentially the same as those depicted in Table 1.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This  paper  aims  at  investigating  whether  electoral  manipulation  of  the  level  and  the 
composition  of  fiscal  policy  can  affect  re-election  prospects.  We  find  evidence  that  re-
election prospects improve following a rise in capital expenditures or a shift of expenditures 
towards  capital  expenditures  during  the  term  in  office,  while  remain  unaffected  by 
manipulation around elections. One possible explanation is that election year manipulation in 
capital expenditures does not affect the probability of re-election due to “low visibility” of 
this  type  of  expenditures.  Capital  expenditures  (e.g.  infrastructure)  are  mostly  long-term 
projects that will increase voters’ utility upon completion. For that reason, capital spending at 
the beginning of the incumbent’s term in office has a positive impact on re-election prospects 
since it allows for a sufficient period in order for this spending to be observed by voters 
before  elections.  Finally,  we  have  indications  similar  to  those  obtained  by  Brender  and 
Drazen (2008), namely  that voters in developed countries dislike and punish at the polls 
deficits and inflation.    13 
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Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std.dev.  Min  Max  Source 
 
leader re-election   115  0.513  0.502  0  1 
 
“World Statesmen” encyclopedia, "Inter-














“World Statesmen” encyclopedia, "Inter-
Parliamentary Union" database 
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Notes: When needed variables are adjusted to count for differences in leader’s and party’s years in office. (L): LEADER, (P): PARTY  
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Table 1. Public investment, composition of expenditures and leader’s re-election prospects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Fiscal variable:  capital  capital  capital  composition  composition  composition 
Fiscal variable term
1  0.094***      0.033**     
  (0.01)      (0.01)     
             
Fiscal variable deviation
2    -0.121      -0.026   
    (0.50)      (0.68)   
             
Fiscal variable non-election
3    0.104***      0.034**   
    (0.00)      (0.01)   
             
initial Fiscal variable
4      0.087**      0.030** 
      (0.01)      (0.02) 
             
growth term  0.054  0.053  0.056  0.044  0.046  0.048 
  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.26) 
             
inflation term  -0.065***  -0.064***  -0.063***  -0.073***  -0.073***  -0.070*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
new democracy  0.241  0.232  0.237  0.318*  0.329*  0.320* 
  (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.22)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
             
illiteracy term  0.015*  0.015*  0.016*  0.016**  0.016*  0.016* 
  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
             
centre  -0.362***  -0.375***  -0.353***  -0.348***  -0.362***  -0.348*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
left   0.168  0.171  0.168  0.168  0.171  0.169 
  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
             
EU  -0.393***  -0.395***  -0.394***  -0.397***  -0.390***  -0.392*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
N  113  113  113  113  113  113 
pseudo R
2  0.259  0.267  0.255  0.264  0.269  0.260 
Log likelihood  -57.992  -57.362  -58.298  -57.585  -57.184  -57.908 
L-R test (p-value)  0.19  0.23  0.19  0.23  0.26  0.22 
Corrected predications (%)   75.22  73.45  75.22  73.45  76.11  74.34 
Notes: Probit estimate coefficients for continuous variable are marginal probability effects computed at sample mean. For dummy 
variables the marginal effect shows the change in the dependent variable when the value of the dummy variable changes from 0 to 
1. In parenthesis we report the p-values based on robust and clustered standard errors. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** 
denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
1 Fiscal variable term: the average of the fiscal variable during the leader’s current term in the office (excluding the election year 
of previous elections, but including the election year of current elections). 
2 Fiscal variable deviation: the change in the fiscal variable in the election year relative to the average of the years preceding 
elections. (excluding the election year of previous elections). 
3 Fiscal variable non-election: the average in the fiscal variable during the leader’s term in the office preceding the election year 
(excluding the election year of previous elections).  
4 initial Fiscal variable: fiscal variable as a percentage of GDP of the leader’s first year during the term in office (we do not 
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Table 2. Public investment, composition of expenditures and leader’s re-election prospects in predetermined elections 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Fiscal variable:  capital  capital  capital  composition  composition  composition 
Fiscal variable term
1  0.165***      0.045***     
  (0.00)      (0.01)     
             
Fiscal variable deviation
2    0.152      0.041   
    (0.41)      (0.53)   
             
Fiscal variable non-election
3    0.164***      0.046***   
    (0.00)      (0.01)   
             
initial Fiscal variable
4      0.141**      0.040** 
      (0.02)      (0.01) 
             
growth term  0.077  0.078  0.082  0.067  0.064  0.073 
  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.19) 
             
inflation term  -0.095***  -0.097***  -0.093***  -0.105***  -0.106***  -0.104*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
new democracy  -  -  -  -  -  - 
             
             
illiteracy term  0.012  0.012  0.016  0.021*  0.021*  0.023* 
  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.27)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
             
centre  -0.376***  -0.372***  -0.358***  -0.329***  -0.323***  -0.330*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
left   0.169  0.151  0.169  0.156  0.146  0.155 
  (0.34)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.42)  (0.38) 
             
EU  -0.364***  -0.363***  -0.378***  -0.368***  -0.371***  -0.377*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
N  68  68  68  68  68  68 
pseudo R
2  0.312  0.315  0.297  0.297  0.299  0.290 
Log likelihood  -32.429  -32.258  -33.120  -33.104  -33.000  -33.445 
L-R test (p-value)  1.00  1.00  0.49  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Corrected predications (%)   73.53  76.47  73.53  77.94  73.53  76.47 
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Table 3. Public investment, composition of expenditures and party’s re-election prospects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Fiscal variable:  capital  capital  capital  composition  composition  composition 
Fiscal variable term
1  0.111***      0.040***     
  (0.00)      (0.00)     
             
Fiscal variable deviation
2    -0.037      -0.010   
    (0.82)      (0.86)   
             
Fiscal variable non-election
3    0.120***      0.042***   
    (0.00)      (0.00)   
             
initial Fiscal variable
4      0.108***      0.041*** 
      (0.00)      (0.00) 
             
growth term  0.060*  0.060  0.062*  0.040  0.040  0.043 
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.23) 
             
inflation term  -0.053***  -0.052***  -0.051***  -0.062***  -0.062***  -0.060*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
new democracy  -0.173  -0.176  -0.189  -0.130  -0.132  -0.145 
  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.18)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.27) 
             
illiteracy term  0.016**  0.016**  0.017***  0.016***  0.016***  0.016*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
centre  -0.221  -0.233  -0.221  -0.201  -0.214  -0.218 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13) 
             
left   0.122  0.121  0.117  0.141  0.142  0.138 
  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
             
EU  -0.526***  -0.528***  -0.529***  -0.524***  -0.521***  -0.520*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
N  122  122  122  122  122  122 
pseudo R
2  0.233  0.237  0.230  0.252  0.257  0.252 
Log likelihood  -63.336  -62.982  -63.584  -61.762  -61.373  -61.755 
L-R test (p-value)  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.22  0.24  0.21 
Corrected predications (%)   71.31  72.95  72.95  72.13  73.77  76.23 
Notes: Probit estimate coefficients for continuous variable are marginal probability effects computed at sample mean. For dummy 
variables the marginal effects shows the change in the dependent variable when the value of the dummy variable changes from 0 to 
1. In parenthesis we report the p-values based on robust and clustered standard errors. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** 
denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
1 Fiscal variable term: the average of the fiscal variable during the party’s current term in the office (excluding the election year of 
previous elections, but including the election year of current elections). 
2 Fiscal variable deviation: the change in the fiscal variable in the election year relative to the average of the years preceding 
elections. (excluding the election year of previous elections). 
3 Fiscal variable non-election: the average in the fiscal variable during the party’s term in the office preceding the election year 
(excluding the election year of previous elections).  
4 initial Fiscal variable: fiscal variable as a percentage of GDP of the party’s first year during the term in office (we do not consider 







   19 
Table 4. Full specification of the budget constraint and leader’s re-election prospects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Fiscal variable:  capital  capital  capital  composition  composition  composition 
Fiscal variable term  0.131***      0.034***     
  (0.00)      (0.00)     
             
surplus term  0.035***      0.026**     
  (0.00)      (0.03)     
             
revenues term  -0.004      0.005     
  (0.56)      (0.33)     
             
Fiscal variable deviation
2    -0.148      -0.047   
    (0.51)      (0.47)   
             
Fiscal variable non-election
3    0.186***      0.043***   
    (0.00)      (0.00)   
             
surplus deviation    0.079**      0.076**   
    (0.03)      (0.02)   
             
surplus non-election    0.048***      0.032**   
    (0.00)      (0.04)   
             
revenues deviation    -0.004      -0.006   
    (0.93)      (0.84)   
             
revenues non-election    -0.007      0.006   
    (0.27)      (0.25)   
             
initial Fiscal variable
4      0.107***      0.030** 
      (0.01)      (0.01) 
             
initial surplus      0.013      0.006 
      (0.34)      (0.69) 
             
initial revenues      -0.005      0.003 
      (0.44)      (0.59) 
             
growth term  0.033  -0.009  0.048  0.036  0.002  0.050 
  (0.48)  (0.87)  (0.28)  (0.44)  (0.97)  (0.27) 
             
inflation term  -0.065***  -0.065***  -0.064***  -0.069***  -0.070***  -0.068*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
new democracy  0.331**  0.358*  0.285  0.397***  0.438***  0.344* 
  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
             
illiteracy term  0.015*  0.018*  0.015*  0.017**  0.021**  0.016* 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
             
centre  -0.394***  -0.375**  -0.360***  -0.384***  -0.352**  -0.360*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
             
left   0.132  0.154  0.160  0.128  0.154  0.157 
  (0.27)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
             
EU  -0.365***  -0.466***  -0.367***  -0.374***  -0.470***  -0.374*** 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
N  112  112  112  112  112  112 
pseudo R
2  0.282  0.324  0.258  0.278  0.314  0.257 
Log likelihood  -55.630  -52.345  -57.468  -55.950  -53.157  -57.541 
L-R test (p-value)  0.380  1.00  0.28  0.32  0.41  0.23 
Corrected predications (%)   75.89  78.57  74.11  75.00  77.68  75.89 
Notes: see Table 1 